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We use cross-national harmonized micro data from a broad sample of developed and developing countries
and investigate the heterogeneity of the effect of entry, contract enforcement regulation, and financial
development on both the decision to become an entrepreneur and the level of employment of newly
created businesses. We focus on the interaction between the level of regulation and financial development
and some individual characteristics that are important determinants of entrepreneurship, such as gender,
business skills, and social networks. We find that entry regulation moderates the effect of business
skills, while accentuating the effect of gender, even after accounting for the level of financial development.
Specifically, women are more likely to enter into entrepreneurship in countries with higher levels of
entry regulation, but mainly because they cannot find better work. This effect is also more pronounced
in countries that are less financially developed. Furthermore, individuals who report having business
skills are less likely to enter entrepreneurship in countries with higher entry regulation. Finally, we
also find that individuals who know other entrepreneurs are less likely to start large businesses in countries












a.lusardi@dartmouth.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Regulation is commonly held to be an important factor in determining a coun-
try’s economic performance. One way in which regulation can impact growth and
employment is its eﬀect on the rate at which new businesses are created as new
entrepreneurial activities can foster innovation, employment, and growth. A bur-
geoning empirical literature has studied the inﬂuence of regulation of product and
labor markets on GDP growth, TFP, investment, and employment using macro
or ﬁrm level data (see Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006) and references therein).
However, little is known about how a country’s regulatory environment aﬀects
individuals’ decisions to engage in new entrepreneurial activity.
Ardagna and Lusardi (2008, 2009) study the eﬀect of entry, contract en-
forcement, and labor market regulation on entrepreneurship using cross-national
harmonized micro data from a broad sample of developed and developing coun-
tries. Building on that work, in this paper we investigate the heterogeneity of
the eﬀect of entry and contract enforcement regulation on both the decision to
become an entrepreneur and the level of employment of newly created businesses.
We focus on the interaction between the level of regulation and some individ-
ual characteristics that are important determinants of entrepreneurship, such as
gender, business skills, and social networks. We investigate whether individuals
with certain characteristics are more or less likely to engage in entrepreneurship
or to start businesses of diﬀerent sizes when they live in countries that diﬀer in
the level of entry and legal system regulation. Moreover, we account for the level
of ﬁnancial development. Speciﬁcally, we add to our empirical models interac-
tion terms between a country-level indicator of credit availability and individual
characteristics. We investigate whether the eﬀects of regulation on the determi-
nants of entrepreneurship work through the availability of credit –for example
because regulation makes credit constraints more likely to be binding (see Desai
et al. (2003))– or whether regulation matters above and beyond this channel.
Our methodology does not allow us to measure the overall eﬀect of regulation
on entrepreneurship. However, we can control for the eﬀect of time invariant
country-level variables and, by focusing on the interaction terms, we can study
t h et y peo fpe o p l ew h oa r ea ﬀected by regulation and the ways in which regulation
inﬂuences entrepreneurial choices. Also, the focus on the level of employment
complements the work of Da Rin et al. (2009 and 2010) and Kerr and Nanda
(2009 and 20101) on the eﬀect of corporate tax policy and the impact of banking
deregulation on entry rates and the size of new entrants, respectively. Similar
to those other papers, in this paper too we examine the eﬀect of policies on
entrepreneurship focusing on both the intensive and extensive margin.
We extend the dataset used in Ardagna and Lusardi (2009) with two more
1years of data (2004 and 2005) and measure the regulation of entry and contract
enforcement with speciﬁc indicators of regulation that were parts of the indices
used in these previous works. The dataset we use makes it possible to distinguish
between two types of entrepreneurs: those who enter entrepreneurship to pursue
a business opportunity (opportunity entrepreneurs) and those whose entrepre-
neurial activity is simply remedial, i.e., they could not ﬁnd a better alternative
(remedial/necessity entrepreneurs). We ﬁnd that entry regulation has an impact
on the eﬀects of gender, social networks, and business skills, even after con-
trolling for the eﬀects of credit availability. Speciﬁcally, women are more likely
to enter into entrepreneurship in countries with higher levels of entry regula-
tion, but mainly because they cannot ﬁnd better work. This eﬀect is also more
pronounced in countries that are less ﬁnancially developed. Furthermore, entry
regulation attenuates the eﬀect of social networks and business skills; individuals
who know other entrepreneurs and report having business skills are less likely
to enter into entrepreneurship in countries with tighter regulation. Even though
some of the eﬀects of entry regulation work via the impact on ﬁnancial develop-
ment, entry regulation aﬀects the determinants of entrepreneurship above and
beyond this channel. Finally, we ﬁnd that the size of new businesses is inﬂu-
enced by the eﬀect that entry and contract enforcement regulation and ﬁnancial
development has on the determinants of entrepreneurship, in particular social
networks. Controlling for the interaction between individual characteristics and
the level of ﬁnancial development, individuals who know other entrepreneurs are
less likely to start large businesses in countries with higher levels of entry and
contract enforcement regulation.
2D a t a
We use micro survey data collected by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
(GEM), a research program started in 1998 that annually collects cross-national
harmonized data on entrepreneurship. We use data from the Adult Population
Surveys in 2001 through 2005. Countries included in our sample cover a wide
spectrum, from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) countries, to Latin American, European and Central Asian (ECA), and
East Asian and Paciﬁc (EPA) countries. We restrict our analysis to individuals
of 18-64 years of age; the total number of observations in our sample is 470,183.1
1The complete list of countries includes Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil,
Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong
Kong, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Latvia, Mexico,
The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Slovenia,
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Uganda, United Kingdom, and
2Our focus is on individuals who are at the initial planning or inception stage
rather than on well-established ﬁrms that have been active for many years and
upon which the regulatory environment can have diﬀerent eﬀects. The variable
of interest is total entrepreneurial activity (TEA). TEAis an indicator variable
equal to one if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and man-
agers of a young ﬁrm; it is equal to zero otherwise. TEA can be further split
into opportunity entrepreneurial activity (Opportunity) and remedial/necessity
entrepreneurial activity (Necessity). Opportunity is an indicator variable equal
to one if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers
of a young ﬁrm to take advantage of a business opportunity; it is equal to zero
if individuals are not starting a business (opportunity entrepreneurs hereafter).
Necessity is an indicator variable equal to one if individuals are starting a new
business or are owners and managers of a young ﬁrm because they could not ﬁnd
better work; it is equal to zero if individuals are not starting a business (reme-
dial/necessity entrepreneurs hereafter). This distinction, which is very close to
the one between self-employment and high-growth entrepreneurship proposed by
Glaeser and Kerr (2009) is important because, as Ardagna and Lusardi (2009)
show, opportunity and remedial entrepreneurs diﬀer substantially both in terms
of personal characteristics and the type of activity they engage into.
We use a variety of demographic variables: age, gender, education, and work-
ing status and we also have information on other potentially important variables
to explain entrepreneurship: self-assessed business skills (Skills), attitudes to-
ward risk (Fear to fail), and social networks (Social networks).2 As several
studies have shown, in addition to some important individual characteristics,
such as age, education and gender, other variables can play a critical role in the
decision to become entrepreneurs, such as business skills, and social networks
(see (Djankov et al. (2008) and Minniti (2005)). We use the richness of informa-
tion provided in GEM to examine whether regulation strenghtens or diminishes
the eﬀect of these determinants of entrepreneurship.
W em e r g et h em i c r os u r v e yd a t ad e s c r i b e da b o v ew i t hd a t ao nc o u n t r i e s ’i n -
stitutional and regulatory environments from the Doing Business Database 2003
from the World Bank3. Speciﬁcally, we focus on entry regulatory indicators for
the United States. See Ardagna and Lusardi (2008, 2009) for a thorough analysis of the quality
of GEM data.
2Skills is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual answers that he or she has the
knowledge, skill, and experience to start a new business; the variable is equal to 0 otherwise.
Fear to fail is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 for individuals who answer that fear of
failing prevents them from starting a new business; the variable is equal to 0 otherwise. Social
networks is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual knows someone who has started a
business in the past two years; the variable is equal to 0 otherwise.
3Data before 2003 are not available. We examined the values of the regulatory indicators
3the product markets and regulation of contract enforcement (indicators measur-
ing the eﬃciency of the justice system in resolving legal disputes) and use two
measures of regulation, deﬁned as follows: Entry procedures:T h en u m b e ro f
procedures that are oﬃcially required to start and operate a new business; and
Contract procedures: The number of procedures required to solve a commercial
dispute. While these aspects of regulation do not cover all regulatory and eco-
nomic policies (e.g., taxes, tariﬀ and non-tariﬀ barriers, regulation of labor, safety
and environmental standards) that can inﬂuence individual entrepreneurial be-
havior, they include some of the most important regulatory constraints across
countries. We also use an important indicator of ﬁnancial market development,
deﬁned as follows: the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks and other
ﬁnancial institutions to GDP available int h eW o r l dB a n kF i n a n c i a lD e v e l o p m e n t
and Structure Database (as described in Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2009))and
commonly used in the macro literature on growth and entrepreneurship (King
and Levine, 1993). The correlation between this index and our indicators of
regulation is 0.54. While highly correlated, both variables have predictive power
when they are included in the regressions.
3 Empirical analysis
There are diﬀerent reasons why individuals enter into entrepreneurship, from
t h ed e s i r et op u r s u ea no p p o r tunity to the inability to ﬁnd a job. Regulation
can aﬀect entrepreneurial types diﬀerently; for example, regulation can increase
the cost of pursuing a business opportunity but can also make labor markets
thinner, thereby increasing entry into remedial entrepreneurship. Moreover, reg-
ulation can have a diﬀerential impact on would-be entrepreneurs depending on
their characteristics. For example, in countries that are more heavily regulated
the threshold for starting a business becomes higher for those whose character-
istics makes them more likely to become entrepreneurs. Thus, it is important to
distinguish among the reasons to start a business and to be able to account for
the rich set of characteristics that might aﬀect entrepreneurship.
We estimate the eﬀects of regulation and ﬁnancial development on entrepre-
neurship as follows: For individual i,i nc o u n t r yj,a tt i m et, let us deﬁne the
outcome of interest yijt,w h e r ey i so n eo ft h et h r e em e a s u r e s :TEA,Opportunity,
Necessity. The following equation for yijt is estimated:
yijt = αj + β1Xijt + β2XijtRj + γt + εijt (1)
for the years 2004 and 2005. For all the countries in our sample the regulatory indicators are
mostly equal to their values in 2003.
4where αj is a vector of country dummies, X is a vector of variables mea-
suring individual characteristics such as age, gender, employment status, and
education, and variables measuring social networks, business skills, and fear of
failure, R captures countries’ regulatory environment and, in one instance, the
development of ﬁnancial markets, and γt are time dummy variables. Since the
dependent variables are binary, we estimate a probit model. We add country
ﬁxed eﬀects to control for time-invariant diﬀerences in macroeconomic and in-
stitutional characteristics of the countries in our sample.4 However, because the
regulatory indices are country and time invariant, once we include αj among our
regressors, we can only measure the diﬀerential eﬀect that personal character-
istics have on the decision to engage or not engage in entrepreneurial activity
because of cross-country diﬀerences in the regulatory environment and the level
of development of ﬁnancial markets. In other words, we can only measure the ef-
fect of regulation via the interaction between countries’ regulation and individual
characteristics. This approach is similar in spirit to the one adopted by Klapper,
Laeven, and Rajan (2006) who study the eﬀect of regulation on industries’ entry
rates using ﬁrms level data.
A key concern, as in most cross-sectional studies, is that the measures of
regulation and (ﬁnancial development) may capture other factors that indepen-
dently aﬀect entrepreneurship. Hence, the results captured in this paper do not
present necessarily casual evidence. Note, however, that in our empirical strat-
egy we control for country-ﬁxed eﬀects to pick-up unobservables such as culture,
religion, institutions that vary across countries, but not over time. While the
endogeneity of regulation may be a less relevant problem in our empirical work
because we focus on the interaction between regulation and individual charac-
teristics, we consider these estimates as a starting point and will investigate the
endogeneity of regulation variables in future work.
We begin the empirical analysis with some descriptive evidence on the rela-
tionship between entrepreneurship and countries’ regulatory environments. In
Table 1, we report the rate of entrepreneurship and regulation across geographic
regions, a classiﬁcation that should be exogenous to both entrepreneurship and
regulatory constraints. We ﬁnd that Latin American countries display the high-
est rate of entrepreneurship while OECD and European Union (EU) countries
display a much lower level of entrepreneurship. However, these statistics hide
a fundamental diﬀerence between the type of entrepreneurs in these countries:
While in OECD and EU countries most of the entrepreneurs are opportunity
entrepreneurs, in Latin America a very large share of entrepreneurs are necessity
4Standard errors are clustered at the country level and we always use weights. The diﬀerence
between weighted and unweighted statistics and weighted and unweighted empirical estimates
is rather small. Results using unweighted data are available upon request.
5entrepreneurs. In fact, the ranking of countries simply reverses when we consider
the ratio of opportunity over necessity entrepreneurs rather than the total rate
of entrepreneurship. Regulation by geographic regions, as measured by the num-
ber of procedures required to start a business, very closely mimics the pattern
described by the ratio of entrepreneurial types in these countries. Regulation is
highest in Latin America and lowest in EU and OECD countries.
As expected, ﬁnancial development is higher in OECD and EAP countries,
the most developed countries. Moreover, countries that exhibit higher regulation
also exhibit lower ﬁnancial development, indicating that regulation may also
impact ﬁnancial development. Most of the new start-ups are rather small and
employ on average 5-6 workers. In fact, most of the start-ups are composed
simply by one person (the entrepreneur), but some employ more than 100 workers
even at this early stage of their life.
Table 2 focuses on entry regulation (measured by the indicator Entry procedures)
and reports the empirical estimates of equation (1) described above.5 Entry reg-
ulation plays a role not only in aﬀecting who becomes an entrepreneur but also
the type of entrepreneurship one engages into. While women are overall less
likely to become entrepreneurs than men, in countries with higher levels of en-
try regulation women do enter into entrepreneurship, but mostly because they
cannot ﬁnd better work. The magnitude of the eﬀect is sizeable. For exam-
ple, in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, where entry regulation is at its
minimum value (Entry procedures =2 ), women are 0.5 percentage points less
likely than men to start a new business because they cannot ﬁnd better work.
Conversely, in Uganda, where entry regulation is at its maximum value (Entry
procedures =1 7 ), women are 0.25 percentage points more likely to start a new
business because they cannot ﬁnd better work.
Entry regulation also moderates the eﬀect of social networks and business
skills, two variables that are important predictors of entrepreneurship. The eﬀect
of knowing other entrepreneurs is less conducive to engaging in both opportunity
and remedial entrepreneurship in countries with higher levels of entry regulation.
Those who report having business skills are 5.8 percentage points more likely to
pursue a business opportunity if they live in a country that requires only 2
procedures to start a business, while they are only 3.9 percentage points more
likely to pursue a business opportunity if they live in a country that requires 17
procedures to start a business. Fear of failure is also an important determinant
of entrepreneurship; those who are afraid of failing are less likely to start a new
business to pursue an opportunity. However, this variable does not seem to be
aﬀected by entry regulation.
5For brevity, in Tables 2 and 3, we report only the estimates of some of the variables included
in the regressions. Estimates of the other variables are available upon request.
6The level of ﬁnancial development has also an eﬀect on entrepreneurship. As
other studies have emphasized, ﬁnancial development works in the same way as
regulation. As shown in Table 2, columns 4-6, in countries with higher levels of
ﬁnancial development women are less likely to be pulled into entrepreneurship
because they cannot ﬁnd better work. Moreover, those who know other entre-
preneurs and have business skills are more likely to start a business to pursue an
opportunity if they live in a country with a high level of ﬁnancial development.
Thus, regulation may be an impediment to businesses because it makes credit
availability more diﬃcult and ﬁnancial constraints more likely to be binding. In
countries where it is more expensive to comply with regulation and where con-
tract enforcement is weaker, a larger fraction of would-be entrepreneurs can be
prevented from starting a new business because of credit constraints.
In Table 2, columns 7-9, we interact all the right-hand-side variables with
both the entry regulatory indicator and the indicator of ﬁnancial development.
Results show that entry regulation remains statistically signiﬁcant even when
accounting for ﬁnancial development. The estimates for both gender and busi-
ness skill also do not change very much in magnitude. Therefore, even after
accounting for the level of ﬁnancial development, women are more likely than
men to be pulled into necessity entrepreneurship and those with business skills
are less likely to become entrepreneurs in more heavily regulated countries. The
eﬀect of entry regulation via social networks is only signiﬁcant at the 10% level
for the index of total entrepreneurial activity.6
In addition to examining the eﬀects of regulation and ﬁnancial development
on the decision to start a business, we also study the eﬀects on the employment
of these businesses. First, it is important to look not only at the extensive
margin, i.e., who starts a business, but also at the intensive margin, i.e., how
many workers do these businesses employ. Second, employment is another useful
proxy for the type of activity entrepreneurs engage into. Rather than relying
on the subjective deﬁnition of Opportunity and Necessity entrepreneurship, we
also examine whether entrepreneurs start a small or a large ﬁrm.
In Table 3, we use as dependent variable the log of the number of employees
(including the entrepreneur), the same controls as in Table 2, and interaction
terms with indicators of entry and contract enforcement regulation and ﬁnancial
development. We ﬁnd that entry regulation moderates the eﬀects of business
skills and social networks. Using the estimates in column 1, in businesses cre-
ated by individuals with business skills employment is about 20 percent higher
in a country that requires only 2 procedures to start a business than in a country
that requires 17 procedures. Also, employment in businesses created by individ-
6Estimates of speciﬁcations that focus on contract enforcement regulation (Contract
procedures) are similar to those shown in Table 2 and are available upon request.
7uals who know other entrepreneurs is 15 percent larger if they live in a country
that requires only 2 entry procedures rather than in a country that requires
17 procedures. However, note that, when accounting for both entry regulation
and ﬁnancial development, the impact of entry regulation on determinants of
entrepreneurship is signiﬁcant mostly for social networks. Using the estimates
in column 3, employment in businesses created by individuals who know other
entrepreneurs is 25 percent higher in a country that requires only 2 entry pro-
cedures than in a country that requires 17 procedures. Hence, the eﬀect on
employment of entry regulation through Social networks is not trivial and it is
robust to controlling for the interaction between individual characteristics and
the level of ﬁnancial development. Similarly, in column 4, we show that contract
enforcement regulation moderates the eﬀects of social networks: employment
in businesses created by individuals who know other entrepreneurs is higher in
countries with lower levels of contract enforcement regulation.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we use GEM data to estimate the eﬀects of entry and contract
regulation and ﬁnancial development on both entry and the size of new busi-
n e s s e s .W h i l ew ec a n n o tm e a s u r et h et o t a ld i r e c te ﬀect of regulation, we study
the heterogeneity of the eﬀect of regulation on entrepreneurship and entry size.
The variables through which regulation aﬀects entrepreneurship are gender, so-
cial network, and business skills. Even after accounting for the level of ﬁnancial
development, we ﬁnd that entry regulation moderates the eﬀect of business skills,
while accentuating the eﬀect of gender. Finally, we ﬁnd that employment in busi-
nesses created by individuals who know other entrepreneurs is lower in countries
with higher levels of entry and contract enforcement regulation.
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Table 1: Entrepreneurship and regulation – Descriptive statistics 
          
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
RATES              
  TEA OPPORTUNITY  NECESSITY  NECESSITY/OPPORTUNITY
              
  mean  s.dev  mean  s.dev mean s.dev     
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
OECD  5.40 22.60 3.683 18.83 0.74  8.60  20.24 
EU  4.53 20.80 2.99 17.04 0.64  7.95  21.27 
ECA  4.16 19.96 1.99 13.97 1.18  10.78  59.07 
EAP  7.74 26.72 4.29 20.28 2.33  15.08  54.21 
LATIN AMERICA  15.38  36.08 7.29 26.00 5.97  23.69  81.83 




for the start-ups         
 
 
  mean  s.dev           
  (1)  (2)           
OECD  5.68  10.90           
EU  5.67  10.51           
ECA  7.12  15.14           
EAP  6.46  12.60           
LATIN AMERICA  4.24  7.36           










  mean  s.dev  mean  s.dev mean s.dev     
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6)     
OECD  6.40 3.46 21.86 5.88  1.20  0.30     
EU  7.25 3.31 22.93 6.25  1.16  0.26     
ECA  8.77 2.64 27.23 7.08  0.39  0.12     
EAP  8.80 2.87 26.50 5.01  1.24  0.17     
LATIN AMERICA  12.10 3.64 35.10 7.46  0.27  0.20     
Notes: Mean  and standard deviation of the dependent variables used in the empirical analysis and of the indices of regulation and financial development are shown in 
Table 1. TEA = 1 if individuals are not starting a new business nor are owners and managers of a young firm, 0 otherwise; OPPORTUNITY = 1 if individuals are 
starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm to take advantage of a business opportunity, 0 if individuals are not starting a business; NECESSITY 
= 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm because they could find no better economic work, 0 if individuals are not 
starting a business; Entry procedures = number of procedures that are officially required to start and operate a new business; Contract procedures = number of 
procedures required to solve a commercial dispute; Financial Development = private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP. OECD 
includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, New 
Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. EU includes Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom; ECA includes Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Slovenia. EAP includes China, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand. Data sources: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, World bank Doing Business Database 2003, World Bank Financial 
Development and Structure Database.  11
Table 2: Start-ups, regulation, and financial development 
SPECIFICATION:  PROBIT REGRESSIONS 
DEPENDENT VAR:.  TEA  OPPORTU
NITY  NECESSITY TEA  OPPORTU
NITY  NECESSITY TEA  OPPORTU
NITY  NECESSITY 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
FEMALE  -0.022*** -0.010*** -0.006***  -0.0072  -0.0071**  0.0008  -0.0181***  -0.0115***  -0.0037** 
  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.0047) (0.0028) (0.0012) (0.0062) (0.0037) (0.0018) 
R*FEMALE  0.001**  0.0003  0.0005***      0.0009  0.0004  0.0003** 
  (0.001)  (0.0003)  (0.0001)      (0.0006)  (0.0003)  (0.0001) 
FIN*FEMALE      -0.0060  -0.0007  -0.0030***  -0.0015  0.0010  -0.0011 
        (0.0040) (0.0023) (0.0011) (0.0035) (0.0020) (0.0011) 
SOCIAL NETWORKS  0.050***  0.031***  0.007***  0.0276*** 0.0174*** 0.0041*** 0.0445*** 0.0291***  0.0048** 
  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.0040) (0.0028) (0.0009) (0.0101) (0.0080) (0.0021) 
R* SOCIAL NETWORKS  -0.001***  -0.001**  -0.0001*      -0.0011*  -0.0007  -0.0001 
  (0.0004)  (0.0003)  (0.00006)      (0.0007)  (0.0005)  (0.0001) 
FIN* SOCIAL NETWORKS      0.0090***  0.0050**  0.0014*  0.0032  0.0013  0.0011 
        (0.0033) (0.0021) (0.0007) (0.0051) (0.0034) (0.0011) 
SKILLS  0.099***  0.062***  0.018***  0.0642*** 0.0335*** 0.0139*** 0.0833*** 0.0444*** 0.0221*** 
  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.0079) (0.0050) (0.0019) (0.0107) (0.0062) (0.0047) 
R*SKILLS  -0.002***  -0.001***  -0.0003***      -0.0013**  -0.0007*  -0.0004** 
  (0.001)  (0.0004)  (0.0001)      (0.0007)  (0.0004)  (0.0002) 
FIN*SKILLS      0.0124**  0.0111***  0.0002  0.0062  0.0077**  -0.0020 
        (0.0060) (0.0038) (0.0013) (0.0055) (0.0033) (0.0014) 
FEAR TO FAIL  -0.023***  -0.016***  0.0002  -0.0199*** -0.0158***  -0.0020**  -0.0221*** -0.0177***  -0.0002 
  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.0045) (0.0029) (0.0010) (0.0080) (0.0046) (0.0022) 
R* FEAR TO FAIL  0.0003  0.0001  -0.0002      0.0002  0.0002  -0.0001 
  (0.001)  (0.0003)  (0.0001)      (0.0006)  (0.0004)  (0.0002) 
FIN*FEAR TO FAIL      -0.0019  0.0011  0.0009  -0.0007  0.0021  0.0001 
        (0.0051) (0.0034) (0.0011) (0.0059) (0.0038) (0.0013) 
OBSERVATIONS  325758 315368 305151 314977 305092 295277 314977 305092 295277 
Table 3: Start-ups size, regulation, and financial development 
SPECIFICATION:  OLS REGRESSIONS 
DEPENDENT VAR.  LOG (NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES + ENTREPRENEUR) 
  R = Entry procedures  R = Contract procedures  R = Entry procedures  R = Contract procedures 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
FEMALE  -0.173*** -0.233***  -0.079  -0.200** 
  (0.041) (0.070) (0.092) (0.084) 
R*FEMALE  0.001 0.003 -0.005 0.002 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) 
FIN*FEMALE     -0.054  -0.012 
     (0.064)  (0.053) 
SOCIAL NETWORKS  0.239*** 0.228*** 0.411*** 0.335*** 
  (0.033) (0.072) (0.091) (0.096) 
R* SOCIAL NETWORKS  -0.009* -0.002  -0.017**  -0.004* 
  (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) 
FIN* SOCIAL NETWORKS     -0.105*  -0.055* 
     (0.058)  (0.033) 
SKILLS  0.220*** 0.202**  0.132  -0.003 
  (0.058) (0.082) (0.130) (0.242) 
R*SKILLS  -0.014** -0.004  -0.009  0.000 
  (0.006) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005) 
FIN*SKILLS     0.052  0.111 
     (0.072)  (0.109) 
FEAR TO FAIL  -0.123* -0.085  -0.126  0.036 
  (0.066) (0.090) (0.159) (0.177) 
R*FEAR TO FAIL  0.008 0.001 0.008 -0.001 
  (0.006) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) 
FIN*FEAR TO FAIL     -0.003  -0.068 
     (0.088)  (0.080) 
OBSERVATIONS  15911 15911 15482 15482 
Notes to Tables 2 and 3: See Footnotes to Table 1 for definition of the following variables: TEA, OPPORTUNITY , NECESSITY , R=Entry procedures in col. (1) and 
(3), R=Contract procedures in col. (2) and (4), FIN=Financial development. Skills=1 if an individual answers that he or she has the knowledge, skill, and experience to 
start a new business; 0 otherwise. Social networks=1 if an individual knows someone who has started a business in the past two years; 0 otherwise. Fear to fail=1if 
individual answers that fear of failing prevents him from starting a new business; 0 otherwise. Other regressors included in Tables 2 and 3: AGE=age of the individual. 
FEMALE=1 if female; 0 otherwise. STUDENT=1 if individual is a student; 0 otherwise. RETIRED DISABLED=1 if individual is retired or disabled; 0 otherwise. 
NOTWORKING=1 if individual not working in any other occupation; 0 otherwise. HIGHSCHOOL=1 if individual has a high school degree; 0 otherwise. COLLEGE=1 
if individual has at least a college degree; 0 otherwise. Country dummies and interaction terms between R and FIN and the regressors not shown are also included. 
Table 2 shows marginal effects (not coefficients). Tables 2 and 3 report standard errors, clustered at the country level in (). 
*Significant at 1%,**Significant at 10%,***Significant at 5%. 